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advance. The Expectation of the number of missiles killed is the Measure of
Effectiveness used to evaluate the models. Numerical results are analyzed through
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Information is known to be an important factor in the determination of the
outcome of military combat. Consequently, the addition of information-gathering and
interpretation assets must be viewed as in legitimate competition with the acquisition
of weapons. In fact, modern "smart" weapons possess within themselves a
combination of brawn: destructive power (e.g. high explosive warhead); and brain:
navigation, identification, guidance and homing power (e.g. on-board sensors and
logic). External C 2 systems are needed to guide overall decision-making: on the
defender's side to detect attacks and to schedule defense response; on the attacker's
side to first soften or confuse (EW measures, deception) the defender prior to a
focused destructive action against sensitive assets.
This thesis seeks to investigate the effects and value of information availability
in a defense against a single mass (simultaneous) missile attack. The analysis is
carried out from the point of view of a defender operating within constraints of a
fixed time window, presumably until destruction of the attacking missiles is no
longer possible at the level considered; "leaking" missiles may be dealt with at an
ensuing defense level. For simplicity we postulate that the objective of the defender
is to maximize the expected number of missiles destroyed at the level under
consideration. The defender is using some weapon system (interceptor missiles,
irradiation weapons,...). This generic weapon system is characterized by its
probability of acquiring a target, acquisition or setup time, and rate of kill. These
parameters are supposedly design features intrinsic to the system. It is possible that
trade-offs between the weapon system characteristics (parameters) exist, in which
case our models may provide some insight in deciding the desirable parameter
configuration.
The three models we develop are of a probabilistic nature, each of them
corresponding to a different information level available to the defender. A higher
information level should enable the user to enhance his strategy and consequently
achieve a gain in defense effectiveness. The general methodology followed is to start
with the basic assumptions of the model and strategy, and work our way analytically
to explicit expressions for the chosen measures of effectiveness. Numerical results
of the probability models are checked against those of discrete-event simulations.
It must be noted that, in this context, the term "information" is used in a
specific but informal sense appropriate to the present application. There is no direct
connection with such classical concepts as Shannon information or Fisher
information. Finally, note that the present problem may appear in other guises, in
which a number of tasks must be performed under time constraints; e.g., in repair
and maintenance or flexible manufacturing.
II. MASS ATTACK WITH INVISIBLE KILL
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter deals with the following situation: A defender is under a mass or
simultaneous attack from a possibly large number of incoming missiles (a "cluster").
Available to the defender is an unspecified outer-layer weapon system, Dl, which
enables him to shoot at least some of the missiles. Each missile, upon being detected
must be acquired, and only then can one attempt to shoot it down. The weapon
system only allows the defender to engage one target at a time, so he faces the
problem of how to optimally assign time to each missile so as to maximize some
measure of the number of missiles destroyed. It is understood that one is working
in a restricted time window: if not destroyed, the missiles will proceed towards their
targets, passing through a secondary defence level. The missiles that are not killed
by Dl are said to leak to the next layer. The general objective is to minimize
leakage.
B. ASSUMPTIONS
In the probability model the following simplifying assumptions will be used:
• The number of attacking missiles is known.
• The probability of acquiring each target is known and fixed; range dependence
is ignored.
• Given that the missile is acquired, the probability distribution of the time to
destroy it is known.
• It is not known to the defender whether a given missile was successfully
acquired or, if acquired was actually killed. This is the minimal information
situation; we call it Invisible Kill.
• There is a fixed setup time expended each time a new attempt is made to
acquire another missile.
Finally, the strategy of the defender will be to allocate time evenly between those
missiles selected for attention by D 1 . Not all attacking missiles will be chosen under
optimal conditions; some will be allowed to leak, presumably with warning
transmitted to the second (inner) defence layer.
C. MODEL
The following notation will be used: Let n be the number of incoming missiles.
The probability of acquiring a target is p , and q - \-p the probability of
acquisition failure. Denote by X the random time to destroy a missile which has
been acquired. T is the time available for destroying the targets - the duration of
the window of opportunity. There is a fixed time necessary for each acquisition
which will be denoted by w.





(x) = Prob { X <> x
\
Target was acquired ) . (2.1)
Suppose one chooses to engage a number, m, of the incoming
missiles; m <> n . Recalling the declared strategy of assigning equal time to each
one, then T - mw + mx; here x is the time allowed to destroy a single missile.
It follows that:
x = - - w . (2.2)
Since each target must be destroyed in less than time x, Prob { destroying a
target} = Prob (a target is acquired upon attempt} * Prob (a target is destroyed in the
time available: max(0, T/m-w) }; i.e.:
T
Prob {destroying a target) = p . Fx ( — - w ) . (2.3)m
Note that since X 2 with probability one, automatically F
x
(x) - if x s .
If it is assumed that each attempt to acquire and destroy a target is an
independent Bernoulli trial, then the number of targets destroyed out
of m, N(T), will be distributed









The current problem is to find the optimal value of m , i.e., one that maximizes this
expected value. Other criteria and controls are of course possible. Note that if the
targets are known to be different , then a strategy that schedules different times to
each type would be reasonable. An extension of this formulation might include a
preliminary classification of target type and subsequent allocation of effort to the
most profitable types first.
D. MODEL DEVELOPMENT
The optimal value of m will now be derived: namely the number of missiles
the defender should engage in order to destroy the maximal expected number of
them at his particular defense layer.
The expected number of destroyed or killed missiles is given by (2.5). We
wish to find the maximum of this function. Set the derivative * - j =
,
dm
implying that if the optimal value, m = m °, is interior, < m ° < n, then
F
x (z-w) = Zfx (z-w), (2.6)
where the parameter z = T/ m°. In principle there can be several such stationary
points, and furthermore the optimal number can be a boundary value: m° -n.
In particular suppose X - Exponential (A) , where the rate parameter may be
interpreted as the number of acquired missiles the weapon kills per unit time. Then:
F
x (x)
= 1 - e
~Xx
, x > ; (2-7)
The expected number of destroyed missiles becomes:
-*(z -w) (2.8)
E[N(T)] = mp[l - e m ]. v '
To maximize this function of m, take the derivative and set it equal to zero.
After some algebra, get:
ln(m) - ln(m + AD + — - Aw = ; (2.9)
m
An approximate explicit solution for m * , a stationary point, even if somewhat
inaccurate, would be desirable to show its dependency on the various parameters.
Start by rewriting (2.9), and using a Taylor expansion:
XT
— - kw = ln(m+A.r) - lnm
m
m m 2m 2
solving for m, yields the approximate explicit result:
(2.10)
m A_ (2.11)
This number will be a positive real. We want an integer solution; therefore the
greatest integer not exceeding m *
,
[m*], and the next lowest integer, <m ' >,
must be checked to see which one has the largest objective function (2.8). Call this
number m**, then the approximate optimal m° will be:
m° = min(rt,m**). <2 - 12 )
Accordingly the corresponding optimal value of the expected number of
missiles killed is, again, approximately:
-H- - w ) (2.13)
E°[N(T)] = m°p [l-e u '].








The function E[N(T)] is concave throughout the domain of m. In this
case m °, if obtained as described above, will be the approximate unique global
maximizer.
E. SIMULATION
To verify the analytical results obtained thus far, a terminating simulation
[Ref. 1] was performed. The measure of effectiveness estimated is the Expected
Number of Missiles Killed per Attack. The attacks were replicated independently,
15000 times, with several combinations of input parameters. The FORTRAN codes
pertaining to the Event routines are displayed in Appendix A. For Timing and
Calendar manipulation routines the SIMUTIL package [Ref. 2] was employed, as
was the LLRANDOMII Random Number Generator [Ref. 3].
The results of the simulation were written to CMS files, and used to generate
several plots of response surfaces. One of these plots is shown in Figure 2.1, with
E[Missiles Killed] as the response variable.
For example, if one takes the time window to be 700, 20 attacking missiles,
the rate of kill 0.01, the acquisition time 10 and the probability of acquisition 0.85;
then solving (2.11) yields m * = 15.652476. Checking m* = 15, 16 with (2.13)
reveals that m * * - 15 ; therefore m ° = min( 15, 20) = 15 . It can be observed from
Figure 2.1, with these values, that the approximate analytical optimal seems to be
in good accordance with the simulation results. Note that obtaining the precisely
correct value of m is not important; the value of the expected number killed is not






p = 0.85; n = 20;
T = 700; X = 0.01
20$
Figure 2.1 Simulation Results
F. USE OF DECOYS BY ATTACKER
It might be of some practical interest to discuss the influence of the use of
decoys, in the results of the previous strategy for Invisible Kill. By assumption the
decoys will be randomly mixed with the missiles within the cluster. As information
available is minimal, the decoys will be undistinguishable from the missiles for the
defender; as a result the defender employs the same strategy regardless of their
presence.
Let r be the fraction of targets which are true missiles, i.e.,
number of missiles (2 16)
number of missiles + number of decoys
Using the current independence assumptions, the number of missiles destroyed
in m trials will be distributed Binomial and its mean will be:
T






If the destruction time is again taken to be Exponential, the same steps already
taken show that the optimal number of targets to engage does not vary with r. The
expected number of missiles destroyed using the optimal strategy decreases, being
multiplied by a factor of r. This result is rather intuitive. Since there is no way the
defender can assess the composition of the attacking target cluster, defense
effectiveness depends directly on the fraction of decoys. Eventually an attack with
large numbers of decoys will succeed in diluting the defender's effort, thus
achieving a high rate of penetration to a subsequent defense layer.
It is interesting to conjecture the payoff from a subsystem capable of
classifying attacking entities as either missiles or decoys with some probability
("skiH"). It may be that tradeoff between some of the other parameters,
e.g., T, w, or X, and classification skill can be beneficial for the overall system
effectiveness. This tradeoff is susceptible to quantitative study conducted in the
mode described throughout this thesis.
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HI. VISIBLE KILL - A THRESHOLD STRATEGY
A. INTRODUCTION
The former chapter dealt with a situation in which there is no direct
information pertaining to when, or if, a given target is destroyed. The previous
assumptions are next modified in a way such that the defender recognizes the instant
when a target is destroyed (VISIBLE KILL), if such an event occurs. Upon
destruction of a target the defender immediately attempts to acquire another (if any
are left). It should be noted that acquisition is still 'not visible', i.e. after the fixed
acquisition time w, the defender does not know if the acquisition was a success.
Thus Dl may have to wait indefinitely for news that a kill has occurred, which leads
to consideration of a time threshold strategy or policy.
B. THRESHOLD MODEL
A threshold policy is adopted: the defender will allow a maximum threshold
time
, x, to be allocated to destruction of a target. If, after time x elapses, the
target is not observed to be destroyed the defender will go back to acquisition mode.
Such a policy is easy to implement and can be justified by dynamic programming
under certain circumstances.
Define Z(x), the total random time to kill one target with a threshold equal
to i. Then, from the assumptions made, the following recursion must hold:
11
Z(t)|X=x = <
w + x if x <>x
(3.1)
>
w + x + Z'(x) if x> x
where X is the random time to destroy an acquired target, in a continuous
engagement. Z (x) is a random variable having the same distribution as Z(t); it
is the time to shoot down a target if the first attempt fails and the process of
acquisition must start over. The CDF of X is known to be F
x
(x).
The upper branch of (3.1) occurs when acquisition is successful and the target
is shot within the prescribed threshold. This has probability pdF
x
(x). The lower
branch occurs if either acquisition fails, or acquisition succeeds but the missile is not
shot in the allowed threshold time. This has probability q +pFx (x). Thus we













(x) = 1 - F
x
(x) . Integration by parts in the numerator gives this slightly
simpler form:
T
w+pf Fx (x)dx +xq (33)
£[Z(x)] =
pFx(x)
The defender wishes to maximize E[N(T)], with x being the decision
variable. Therefore we must express E[N(T)] in terms of the expectation (3.3) just
derived.
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If we interpret each missile destruction as a point event, then Z(t) would be
the random interarrival time. If we had a "continuous supply" of missiles, and a
large time window
, T, then from the elementary renewal theorem [Ref. 4]:
E[N(T)] - . (3.4)
E[Z(x)]
In fact, a correction term might be added [Ref. 4]:
E[N(T)] T + Var[Z(z)]-E
2 [Z(x)]
(3 5)
E[Z(x)) 2£ 2 [Z(t)]
This requires the computation of the variance of Z(x) which is more difficult and
leads to a complex expression. In this paper we retain the approximation (3.4),










The defender's problem is to find:
:° = argmax E[N(T)]
< i s T •
(3.7)
x°, the optimal threshold can be looked for among the critical points on the
interior of its domain, or at x = T.
For example, say X - Exponential {X) . After substitution of the appropriate
expressions for the distribution:
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W)]» r/
(1 - gAT >
; (3 .8)
X
Simulations were conducted to study the dependence of E[N(T)] on the
parameters A., w, t, p. Plots resulting from these simulations are displayed and
discussed on Appendix B.
Again we seek the critical points of E[N(T)] by finding the zeros of its
derivative:
§ESMA =0 .(i,^*i)«-".i, (3.9)
dx q
or equivalently, by taking logarithms of both sides:
ln(AT+A^ + i) = xx. (3.10)
q
If p - 1 , it can be verified that x° = T, otherwise the optimal threshold is to be
found as a solution to (3.9) or (3.10).






and expanding the exponential term:
e^ n i+At+-^. (3.12)
2





A second, more accurate solution, is derived by taking (3.13) as the initial








V Q ^ W 1





Optimal threshold values obtained with the approximations (3.13) and (3.14)
are shown in Table 3.1, together with numerical solution of (3.10).
Table 3.1 OPTIMAL THRESHOLD APPROXIMATIONS (p=0.85)
w\ X 0.01 0.05 0.1
5.0
(3.10) 71.895584 28.074877 18.164104
(3.13) 81.649658 36.514837 25.819889
(3.14) 72.721021 29.928094 20.659227
10.0
(3.10) 96.921939 36.328208 22.991621
(3.13) 115.470054 51.639778 36.514837
(3.14) 99.285331 41.318454 29.264013
20.0
(3.10) 128.640050 45.983242 28.435654
(3.13) 163.299316 73.029674 51.639778
(3.14) 135.311964 58.528026 42.703706
Although the approximations are not always accurate, they are still useful since
the expected number of missiles killed is not very sensitive to the threshold value
(see Appendix B). Table 3.2 shows values of E[N(T)], obtained from (3.8) with
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optimal thresholds given by (3.10), (3.13) and (3.14). As it is seen, the three
methods of deriving the optimal threshold produced very similar results.
Table 3.2 EXPECTATION OF MISSILES KILLED (T=700, £=0.85)
w \ X 0.01 0.05 0.1
5.0
(3.10) 5.138864 20.368877 33.569134
(3.13) 5.133375 20.176869 32.874955
(3.14) 5.138821 20.357661 33.476053
10.0
(3.10) 4.777647 16.784567 25.374494
(3.13) 4.764086 16.437478 24.395642
(3.14) 4.777394 16.738027 25.100826
20.0
(3.10) 4.271479 12.687247 17.364481
(3.13) 4.241009 12.197821 16.343659
(3.14) 4.270129 12.550413 16.865152
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C. SIMULATION
Optimal values, E°[N(T)], obtained from (3.8) and (3.10), were compared
to those of simulations, for several values of X . The simulation code is very
similar to the program "Threshold Simulation" given in Appendix A. The results are












0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.1
RATE
MODEL %?% SIMULATION
Figure 3.1 Threshold Policy - Results
As can be seen, the model slightly underestimates the simulated values,
although its adequacy is seen to improve for larger values of the killing rate.
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IV. DEFENSE WITH PERFECT TASK INFORMATION
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Suppose one is given n tasks, with the objective of completing the maximum
possible number of them within a fixed time window of length T. (E.g., a batch of
jobs arriving at a repair facility at the beginning of the day; a cluster of missiles that
must be destroyed in limited time). Assume, as an example, that the duration of each
task is known, and drawn from an Exponential distribution. Since the objective is
to maximize the number of tasks completed, one obvious strategy is to process the
tasks in ascending order of their completion times. This policy will be referred to
as a Smallest-First (SF) rule, in the same fashion Coffman [Ref. 5] uses Largest-
First. In the context of our missile defense problem the above formulation is
artificial because task times would never be known in advance. Note, though, that
application of the rule only requires knowledge of the order, and not the actual task
(shoot-down) time. Therefore the results provide an upper bound on the
effectiveness of the outer defense layer, Dl.
Denote by X
t
the time for completion of the i,h task. These times are




order statistic being X,~ . If the SF rule is employed, then for some j <n:





+w (4 - 1}
in which case only /' tasks may be completed or "packed" in time T. Call the
number of tasks packed with a SF rule N(T), a random variable. The aim of this
chapter is to find the probability mass function (PMF) of N(T), or accurate
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approximations to that PMF. This can then be used to evaluate measures of system
effectiveness, which can be compared to the results of applying other rules that are
based on less information.
Similar problems have been treated in recent literature, although in a more
general way and with different objectives and methodology than that presented here.
For example, Coffman, Fayolle, Jacquet and Robert [Ref. 5] obtained asymptotic
results for the expected number packed, under a Largest-First (LF) rule; with the
samples being drawn from a (7(0,1) distribution. Coffman, Flatto and Weber
[Ref. 6] derived the asymptotic value of the expected number of intervals selected
with an optimal 'threshold' rule, for a class of distributions. Theirs is an "ON-
LINE" rule, i.e., according to their own definition, the decision to pack or not the
interval (job) is made at the time of inspection. The missile problem, i.e. of rank-
ordering task times, would also necessarily have to be solved "ON-LINE".
B. EXACT PMF OF N(T)
The following well-known results are relevant to the derivation of the PMF
of N(T).
1. Distribution of Spacings
The distribution of the differences between exponential order statistics is
next presented. More detail can be found, e.g., in Barlow and Proschan [Ref. 7].
Let X,,... y Xn be i.i.d. exponential with parameter X. Defme the









k = l,...,/i .
The normalized spacings nDp (rt-l)D2 , ... ,Dn are again i.z.d. exponential with
rate X . Let these normalized spacings be denoted by Y.,...,Y , respectively.














= (»-; + l)Xw - (n-; + l)XH) ,













Define the summation of the order statistics:
' ft
(° h n-i + l * (4.5)
j = 1, ... ,n.









X 2 i-\ \n-i + l)
2. Convolution of Exponentials
The following result, for the convolution of independent Exponential
densities, will be used in deriving the distribution of S . See, e.g.. Feller [Ref. 8].
Let Xj , ... , X have densities
A,f
fx (t) = X.e "* , r>0; k t + kki Vi*k.




+ X has density:
fsW
( J \( J
with the B. defined by the following product:
*,,,





3. Derivation of the PMF of N(T)
In the current case S , as defined in (4.5), is a linear combination of










thus S can be viewed as a sum of j independent exponential random variables
with different rates. Then applying result (4.8) yields the distribution, after some
algebra:
A,w = i znn 'n-k+1 n-i + lV
1 ~ kt
k*i
j = 1 it-1 ; A > ; t > .
To derive the PMF of N(T) the density above is used:
P(N(T)=j) = F
s (D - F5 (D ;













j-i + l -mkT (4.13)
n-i + 1
defined for j = 1, ... , n-1 .
Using (4.12) we have the desired PMF for / = 1,.. , n-2. The
values / =0, n-1, n have not been covered so far.
22
P(N(T)=n) = P(£X.*r) = F





is a sum of i.i.d. exponential Random Variables, then:
S
n
~ Gamma ( n, A ) , A > ;
-P(N{T)=n) = 1 -«-* r£^ ;
If no task is completed, the shortest time to complete a task must be
bigger that the time window, i.e.:
P(N(T)=0) = FAT) = e nkT . (4.16)
Then by a generalization of the domain of definition in (4.13),
ifj *
(4.13) i// = l,...,n-l
Vf'CW •,• ' (4 - 1?)
1 ifjzn + \
With this broader definition of F*(T) (4.12) holds for the whole range of
/, (0, 1, ... , n), and an exact PMF of N(T) has been derived.
C. APPROXIMATION TO THE PMF OF N(T)
To recapitulate, an exact but complicated formula for the PMF of N(T) has
been derived earlier; see (4.17). We now desire an approximation, which might be
23
easier to use. This can be achieved via the distribution (CDF) of S in the following
way:









Analysis of simulation data, e.g. using probability plots, suggest that
the 5 are approximately distributed Gamma (see Appendix C for details). If the
approximation is good enough it can be used to compute values
of P(N(T) =/"). The values of the Expectation and Variance of the 5 are
available in (4.6).
If 5 is to be distributed Gamma with parameters shape a. and
rate p , then:





from which the parameter values of the approximating distribution can be derived,








1=1 k - i +
1
1=1 rc-i + 1
It was seen that this approximation produces good results in computing the PMF of N( T )
using (4.18). Another approximation method is presented next.
2. Normal Approximation
If we assume that 5 can be represented by a Normal distribution then
the resulting Normal approximation,with $ ( ) denoting the probability mass in the













] defined by (4.6).
D. RESULTS
Once more analytical results were checked through a Monte Carlo simulation.
The simulation program replicated independent "packing experiments". The values
of "Number Packed" (or tasks completed) thus obtained, were then used in an APL
function to compute the "experimental" distribution of N{T). This distribution is
plotted together with the corresponding approximations and exact PMF, (4.12). The
inclusion of a continuity correction in the Normal Approximation provided no
substantial improvement. The Normal approximation was seen to work better than
portrayed in Figure 4.1, for cases with bigger values of n, as should be expected.
25















n = l0; T=70
rate = 0.05
3 4 5 6 7
Number of Jobs
NORMAL | | SIMUL §§3 EXACT f§§§ GAMMA
Figure 4.1 Simulation and Analytical Results
Suppose an unsophisticated policy is used, so jobs are taken randomly, without
ordering. In that case N(T) ~ Poisson(X) , and E[N(T)] = XT. The PMF of
the number of jobs completed in this way, was compared with the corresponding
PMF under a SF rule. This gives a measure of the benefits of employing the latter
policy. Results are summarized in Table 4.1. It can be seen in the bottom row that,
for this particular set of parameters, the SF rule accounts for an increase in Expected
value of about 85%.
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Table 4.1 COMPARISON OF RESULTS
FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF TASKS COMPLETED




2 0.000031 0.000056 0.184959
3 0.002800 0.000034 0.002531 0.002934 0.215785
4 0.037800 0.019231 0.035266 0.035456 0.188812
5 0.152300 0.195998 0.158881 0.156441 0.132169
6 0.315000 0.342860 0.310115 0.309978 0.077098
7 0.301300 0.252402 0.301318 0.303980 0.038549
8 0.152500 0.122254 0.151571 0.151470 0.016866
9 0.035700 0.047305 0.036936 0.036370 0.006559
10 0.002600 - - 0.003315 0.002296
AVG 6.487500 6.284765 6.458033 6.493038 3.500000
E. APPLICATION TO MISSILE DEFENSE
We now proceed to incorporate the results obtained from the packing problem
to a missile attack situation. As before, the defender must acquire and shoot the
maximum number possible of n incoming missiles, within a restricted time window.
1. Assumptions
The missiles are acquired with probability p, acquisitions being
independent Bernoulli trials. A fixed time, w, is spent for each acquisition. The
defender, knowing the ordering of the "missile killing times", will select them for
acquisition with a SF rule. It is not recognized if acquisitions are successful or not.
Consequently, the first time the defender fails to acquire a missile the residual time
window is expended and no more missiles are shot. Presumably the performance
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could be improved by introducing a threshold, as was done earlier, but this option
has not been studied.
2. Model
Let N(T) now represent the number of missiles killed in time T, under
the above assumptions; then,
P(N(T) */) = p jFs (T-jw); (4.22)
resulting in the PMF:
P(N(T) =;) = pjFs (T-jw) -pJ+i Fs (T-(j+\)w)
.
(4.23)
Recalling that F, (f) = 1 -F
v
(f) can be obtained from (4.13).
The result (4.23) applied to a given set of parameters is plotted in Figure
4.2 together with corresponding values obtained through simulation.
For the purpose of comparison the results of the model were checked
against those obtained from employing the unsophisticated strategy, i.e., taking the
missiles in random order. In this case the distribution of N(T) is obtained in the
same fashion, by using (4.23), but with the difference that now 5 is distributed
Gamma with shape j and rate X. The model is seen to agree reasonably well
with the "experimental simulation data" as further detailed in Table 4.2. It is also
verified a substantial improvement by using the SF strategy.
A noticeable feature of the distribution is that it is no longer unimodal, unlike
similar distributions for the packing problem. In plots generated with different rate
values one local minimum appeared between two maxima, one of them located at
zero. Figure 4.3 depicts a situation in which the rate is 0.1 and 20 missiles are
present, all other parameters remaining equal to the previous situation. As can be
28








Figure 4.2 Model and Simulation Results
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Table 4.2 PERFECT TASK INFORMATION PMF
j
— — ... i .-—- .
SIMULATION MODEL NO STRATEGY
0.148574 0.150000 0.182953
1 0.117059 0.127500 0.238861
2 0.113057 0.108782 0.259735
3 0.111056 0.106964 0.191905
4 0.180590 0.171499 0.091931
5 0.205103 0.212791 0.028368
6 0.107554 0.104298 0.005541
7 0.016508 0.017283 0.000659
8 0.000500 0.000872 0.000045
9 0.000011 0.000002
10
AVG 3.189096 3.169751 1.881847
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In the preceding chapters we developed three models for defense against
missile attacks. For each model analytic results were compared with simulations, for
some range or combination of parameters. To summarize, our three models
correspond to the following situations, in ascending order of information availability:
Invisible Kill
Unknown: If acquisition successful.
If and when missiles shot.
Strategy: Allocate time evenly between all engaged missiles.
Decision: How many missiles to engage.
Visible Kill
Unknown: If acquisition successful.
Known: Time when missile killed (if killed).
Strategy: Allocate a max threshold time to each missile engagement.
Decision: Length of threshold.
Perfect Task Information
Unknown: If acquisition successful.
Known: Times of destruction of each missile.
Strategy: Engage missiles with SF rule.
Throughout our work, whenever numerical results were necessary, assumptions
on the values of the parameters had to be taken. We have used what seemed to be
"reasonable" values of killing rates, acquisition times, time window, etc. These,
however, may differ from actual parameter values to be found in existing weapon
systems. For this reason we now seek to "validate" the models in more general
conditions. We wish to verify and compare our models in a reasonable number of
parameter (factors) combination without too much simulation effort. The response
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variable to consider for validation/comparison purposes will be the expected number
of missiles destroyed. The models depend on five input parameters or
factors: n,p, w, X, T. The same distribution for the Killing Time will be used - an
Exponential. In order to generate input parameter values we chose a two level
fractional factorial design, 2 V , [Ref. 9], which seems to attain the above stated
objectives. This design corresponds to the input data set displayed on Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 INPUT DATA
RUN X D P w T
1 0.05 50 1.0 15.0 70.0
2 0.1 10 1.0 5.0 200.0
3 0.1 50 1.0 15.0 200.0
4 0.05 10 0.85 5.0 200.0
5 0.1 10 0.85 5.0 70.0
6 0.1 50 0.85 15.0 70.0
7 0.05 10 1.0 5.0 70.0
8 0.1 10 1.0 15.0 70.0
9 0.05 10 0.85 15.0 70.0
10 0.1 10 0.85 15.0 200.0
11 0.05 10 1.0 15.0 200.0
12 0.05 50 0.85 5.0 70.0
13 0.05 50 1.0 5.0 200.0
14 0.1 50 0.85 5.0 200.0
15 0.1 50 1.0 5.0 70.0
16 0.05 50 0.85 15.0 200.0
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1. Invisible Kill
The simulation was carried out in the following way: For each run, the
optimal value of the number of missiles to engage was computed according to the
model equation (2.11). In each run the simulation replicates enough independent
attack experiments to get estimates of the average number of missiles killed and
95% confidence bounds. The same average was computed from the model equation
(2.13). Results are compared in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 INVISIBLE KILL VERIFICATION
RUN LOWER AVERAGE UPPER MODEL
1 1.248880 1.260090 1.271298 1.264240
2 7.711665 7.736362 7.761059 7.768698
3 2.981409 3.005450 3.029490 2.997817
4 4.461138 4.487008 4.512877 4.484883
5 2.301197 2.321421 2.341643 2.341143
6 0.746798 0.759386 0.771993 0.752077
7 1.819565 1.835803 1.852040 1.858953
8 0.867102 0.880358 0.893614 0.884797
9 1.060356 1.071748 1.083138 1.074604
10 3.318501 3.342890 3.367278 3.344489
11 3.099832 3.122495 3.145157 3.147755
12 1.544501 1.560270 1.576038 1.580111
13 5.153650 5.183533 5.213414 5.199824
14 6.658032 6.693637 6.729240 6.688979
15 2.723549 2.744591 2.765632 2.757285
16 2.660858 2.682709 2.704558 2.675591
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As further depicted in Figure 5.1, all runs produced satisfying results.
Considering that (2.13) is an approximation, the model values seem to be in
accordance with those of the simulation.
Figure 5.1 Invisible Kill Verification
2. Visible Kill - Threshold Strategy
We first determined the optimal threshold for each run by numerical
solution of (3.10), (when p-\,q-0 the optimal threshold will be T). The
simulation is executed for each combination of factors (run) and optimal threshold.
Analytical values (model) are obtained from (3.8). As can be seen in the following
table and figure, the results obtained from the model are not always accurate as
compared to the simulation. In fact the model predicts an expectation of about 13
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missiles destroyed, when only 10 are present in the attacks corresponding to run 2.
This is an expected result considering the crude approximations taken in Chapter III.
Otherwise we find the agreement model/simulation to be quite acceptable.
Table 5.3 VISIBLE KILL VERIFICATION
RUN LOWER AVERAGE UPPER MODEL
1 2.132568 2.148101 2.163632 1.973662
2 9.907267 9.924894 9.942521 13.333333
3 7.941874 7.966734 7.991593 7.999999
4 5.966601 6.009499 6.052395 5.819679
5 3.540552 3.572495 3.604436 3.356913
6 1.996812 2.016756 2.036670 2.057663
7 3.296708 3.323905 3.351101 2.782671
8 2.754568 2.767375 2.780181 2.798467
9 1.479404 1.500816 1.522227 1.441650
10 5.823129 5.858012 5.892895 5.879036
11 5.904632 5.930957 5.957281 5.714175
12 2.212835 2.241029 2.269221 2.036888
13 8.536298 8.581685 8.627071 7.999927
14 9.724030 9.779253 9.834475 9.591181
15 5.016041 5.043329 5.070617 4.665247
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Simulation *- Model
Figure 5.2 Visible Kill Verification
3. Perfect Task Information
Proceeding in an analogous way we compare the expected number of






with P(N(T) -j) being given in (4.23).
The fit between model and simulation is seen to be excellent in this case.
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Table 5.4 PERFECT TASK INFORMATION VERIFICATION
RUN LOWER AVERAGE UPPER MODEL
1 3.972124 3.978036 3.983947 3.981028
2 9.888283 9.905581 9.922877 9.927288
3 11.701859 11.723443 11.745027 11.743412
4 4.248149 4.312770 4.377340 4.294308
5 3.632813 3.682852 3.732889 3.672681
6 2.672961 2.703552 2.734142 2.708608
7 5.097260 5.116289 5.135318 5.110362
8 3.470990 3.481924 3.492857 3.484863
9 2.161409 2.185453 2.209497 2.198917
10 4.157371 4.219392 4.281412 4.211194
11 7.053313 7.071574 7.089834 7.088154
12 4.354237 4.421083 4.487927 4.388366
13 19.723969 19.771378 19.818771 20.385315
14 5.409484 5.520819 5.632153 5.554571
15 10.613348 10.635718 10.658088 10.652422
16 4.589483 4.664865 4.740247 4.691323
B. COMPARISON OF STRATEGIES
Given that not all the models produced equally reliable results, we chose to
compare the different strategies using simulation. Again, the input data set of Table
5.1 is used to generate the values depicted in Figure 5.4.
Clearly the SF strategy in the Perfect Task Information situation shows the best
overall performance. This is not a surprising result, since this strategy benefits from
the highest level of information. Also the Threshold strategy comes next in overall
performance, and Invisible Kill produces the worst results. More unexpected is the
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Figure 5.3 Perfect Task Information Verification
fact that in three cases (runs 4, 10, 14) Threshold wins from Perfect Task Information,
which is even outperformed by the modest Invisible Kill in run 14. Although these
exceptions do not alter the conclusion that models with access to more information
perform better overall, it is somewhat surprising that this situation does not occur for
every combination of parameters. A closer look at the conspicuous runs reveals that
in all of them p = 0.85 , T - 200. Thus the explanation for the underperformance of
Perfect Task Information must lie in the fact that acquisition is still invisible (see
IV.E.l). This implies that, given sufficient time, the defender eventually fails to
acquire. Unlike with Threshold and Invisible Kill there is no chance of reacquisition.
However, we see that in more favorable conditions, particularly when acquisition




Perfect Info Threshold -^- Invisible Kill
Figure 5.4 Comparison of Strategies
The shortcomings in the Perfect Task Information strategy, can be overcome
by refining the model assumptions in IV.E.l. The proposed refinement consists on
including a "threshold" time, such that, after this time has elapsed without target
destruction being observed, the defender reattempts acquisition of the same target.
Various thresholds can be used (e.g., the largest task time). The most natural
thresholds will be the known task times (in this case, knowledge only of the
ordering is not sufficient).
With this improvement the Perfect Task Information model clearly dominates
for all simulated runs, as Figure 5.5 shows. We do not provide analytical results for
this improved model.
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Translated into a context where the weapons of the defender consist on
interceptor missiles, these findings seem to strongly favor a system that enables the
defender to assign each interceptor according to the shortest time for interception
(SF).
25
Improved Pert. Info -*- Threshold *- Invisible Kill
Figure 5.5 Comparison with Improved Perfect Information
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C. APPLICATION EXAMPLE
Suppose one is planning a weapon system to face a threat that allows a time
window 7\ and that we can forecast that n missiles will be used in each attack.
We have chosen one of the three models to be the most adequate to describe the
weapon system that can be built. Then we have, from our analytic work, the
function:
E[N(T)] =/a,p,w;r,n). <5 -2 )
The arguments T and n are dictated by the threat, while \,p, w can be
incorporated in the design of the defense system, within technical feasibility and
resource constraints, and are thus subject to decision. Further, suppose we can
estimate the cost functions of increasing the probability of
acquisition
,




The decision for the optimal combination of parameter to design into the










The models developed in this thesis may provide a basis for further work
leading to realistic models of missile attack situations. For this objective to be
attained, "real world" data and system specific information must be used to validate
the models. Further investigation may be needed to verify the nature of the
distribution of the killing times, or the robustness of the models to distributional
assumptions.
A possible refinement would be to drop the assumption of invisible acquisition
which is common to all three models but heavily penalizes the model of Perfect
Task Information.
It might also be useful to consider other objective functions. For example, one
may argue that in a scenario where some missiles are almost certain to leak, it
makes more sense to attempt to minimize the maximum number of leaking missiles.
Under some circumstances it may be desirable to maximize the probability of killing
all attacking missiles; under others it may be useful overall to expend some
resources to pass information about leaking missiles (course, estimated time of
arrival) to a secondary defense level, D2. There are numerous other options and
opportunities.
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APPENDIX A. FORTRAN CODES
In this appendix we list the most important programs and routines. The codes
are written in Fortran77 and were run on an Amdahl 5990-5000, at the NPS
Computer Center.
The simulation programs shown were used to verify the numerical results
obtained with the probability models. The version of the Perfect Task Information
model presented is the one without the threshold improvement. A program to
generate exact (analytical) results of the Perfect Task Information is also included.
Exact computations for the other two models are simple and can be done on a
programmable calculator.
All simulations terminate either with the destruction of the last missile or when
the window elapses.
A. INVISIBLE KILL
The main program, "Mass Attack with Invisible Kill", implements the
simulation to verify the model developed in Chapter II. The program executes
independent replications of the simulation of a missile attack, to compute the
expected number of missiles killed. This is done for the 16 sets of parameters
displayed in Table 5.1, and with m° found as shown in Chapter II.
Two event routines are present: "Acquisition" and "Shooting". The simulation
also requires the SIMUTIL package [Ref. 2], LLRANDOMII [Ref. 3], and
subroutine STAT.
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A descriptive list of the variables follows:
• "ProbAcq" is the probability of acquisition denoted by p in Chapter II.
• "TimeWindow" is the time available to destroy the targets, T
.
• "TimeAcq" is the fixed acquisition or setup time, w
.
• "TimetoKill" is the time allowed to shoot down a single target.
• "Rate" is the killing rate, and also represents the rate parameter of an
exponential distribution, X
.
• "Average", "Variance" and "IntervalWidth" are statistics of the number of
missiles killed per attack, taken from the sample of all the simulated attacks.
These statistics are computed by subroutine STAT.
• "Lower" and "Upper" are the 95% confidence bounds for the expectation of
the number of missiles killed.
• "Iseed" is the seed for the random number generator. It is initialized through
a "Read" statement at the beginning of the simulation.
• "NrMissiles" is the number of missiles in an attack, n.
• "m" is the optimal number of missiles to engage. It is computed through
approximation (2.1 1), as described in Chapter II. It is an input parameter to the
simulation.
• "Processed" counts missiles as they are generated.
• "NrAcquired" counts the number of successful acquisitions.
• "MissilesDown" counts the number of missiles shot. It is used as an input by
subroutine "STAT" to compute the average number of missiles killed.
• The integer variables "i" and "k" are indices used in "Do" loops.
• "Acquired" is a logical variable and has value .True, when the missile being
processed has been successfully acquired.
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*• "Destroyed" is a logical variable. It has value .True, when the missile being
processed is destroyed.
• "Tsample" is the random time to destroy a missile sampled from an
exponential distribution with rate X .
• "Now" is the current simulation time. It is controlled by subroutine SIMGO
[Ref. 2].
The Fortran77 code for the simulation is as follows:
PROGRAM Mass Attack with Invisible Kill
REAL ProbAcq, TimeWindow, TimeAcq, TimetoKill, Rate, Average,
+Variance, IntervalWidth, Lower, Upper
INTEGER Iseed, NrMissiles, m, Processed, NrAcquired, k,
+MissilesDown, i
COMMON/ SHARE2/ Processed, NrAcquired, MissilesDown
COMMON/ SHARE3/ Iseed, ProbAcq, TimeAcq, TimetoKill, Rate,
+NrMissiles
COMMON/ SHARE4/ TimeWindow
COMMON/ SHARE5/ Average, Variance, IntervalWidth, Lower, Upper
Create input and output files.
OPEN( 15, FILE='/EXPINV DATA')
OPEN( 20, FILE='/EXPINV OUTPUT')
*
*
uiitialize the seed for the random number generator
READ(15, *) Iseed
Do i = 1, 16
Read one combination of input parameters (see Table 5.1), and replicate the
* simulation for each of them.
Read (15,*) Rate, NrMissiles, ProbAcq, TimeAcq, TimeWindow, m
The time assigned to shoot at each missile is computed from the optimal
* number of missiles killed according to equation (2.2).
If( m .ne. ) then









Perform independent replications of the simulation.
Do k = 1, 15000
CALL INIT
CALL SIMGO
CALL STAT( MissilesDown, k)
End Do







* Initialize variables used in the simulation before each replication.
REAL Now, TimeWindow
INTEGER Processed, NrAcquired, MissilesDown
*
COMMON/ SHARE 1/ Now








Schedule the first acquisition event
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CALL SCHEDULE( Now, 1)
*
* Schedule end of attack after time window elapsed




REAL X, ProbAcq, Now, TimeAcq, TimetoKill, Rate
INTEGER Iseed, NrAcquired, Processed, MissilesDown, NrMissiles
LOGICAL Acquired
COMMON/ SHARE 1/ Now
COMMON/ SHARE2/ Processed, NrAcquired, MissilesDown




* Sample from a Uniform(0,l), to determine if acquisition was successful
CALL RANNUM( 1, Iseed, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, X)
Acquired = .FALSE.
If( X .le. ProbAcq ) Acquired = .TRUE.
If( Acquired ) then
NrAcquired = NrAcquired + 1
* Schedule a shooting event for the acquired missile, after acquisition time
elapsed.
CALL SCHEDULE( Now+TimeAcq, 2)
Return
else
Processed = Processed + 1
If( Processed .It. NrMissiles ) then
* If not acquired and not all missiles have been processed, schedule another
* acquisition.
CALL SCHEDULE! Now+TimeAcq+TimetoKill, 1)
else
* End the simulation if all missiles have been processed








REAL Now, TimeAcq, ProbAcq, Rate, Tsample, TimetoKill
INTEGER MissilesDown, Processed, Iseed, NrAcquired, NrMissiles
LOGICAL Destroyed
COMMON/ SHARE 1/ Now
COMMON/ SHARE2/ Processed, NrAcquired, MissilesDown
COMMON/ SHARE3/ Iseed, ProbAcq, TimeAcq, TimetoKill, Rate,
+NrMissiles
SAVE SHARE2
Samples the task time from an Exponential distribution
CALL RANNUM( 3, Iseed, Rate, 0.0, 0.0, Tsample)
Destroyed = .FALSE.
If the random task time is less than the time assigned to shoot the missile, it
will be destroyed.
If( Tsample .le. TimetoKill ) Destroyed = .TRUE.
If( Destroyed ) MissilesDown = MissilesDown + 1
Processed = Processed + 1
If( Processed .It. NrMissiles ) then
Schedule another acquisition event
CALL SCHEDULE( Now+TimetoKill, 1)
else
if all missiles processed, end the attack






Most of what was written for the Invisible Kill case still applies. All variables
retain their meanings. The variable "Threshold" is introduced to denote the optimal
threshold, x° , which must be supplied to the simulation. In the current case
optimal thresholds were computed by numerical solution of (3.10).
Fortran listing follows:
PROGRAM Threshold Simulation
REAL ProbAcq, TimeWindow, TimeAcq, Threshold, Rate
+,Average, IntervalWidth, Variance, Lower, Upper
INTEGER Iseed, NrMissiles, Replications, MissilesDown, k
COMMON/ SHARE2/ MissilesDown
COMMON/ SHARE3/ Iseed, ProbAcq, TimeAcq, Threshold, Rate,
+NrMissiles
COMMON/ SHARE4/ TimeWindow
COMMON/ SHARE5/ Average, Variance, IntervalWidth, Upper, Lower
OPEN( 15, FILE= ,A,HRESH DATA')
OPEN( 20, FILE='/TKRESH OUTPUT')
Read(15,*) Iseed
Do k = 1, 16
* Read input parameters and optimal threshold






* Replicates at least 10,000 times and until 95% confidence interval is less than
* or equal to 5% of the average.
Do While( IntervalWidth .gt. 0.05*Average .or.
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+ Replications .le. 10000 )
Replications = Replications + 1
CALL INIT
CALL SIMGO
CALL STAT( MissilesDown, Replications)
End Do







REAL X, Now, ProbAcq, TimeAcq, Threshold, Rate
INTEGER Iseed, MissilesDown, NrMissiles
LOGICAL Acquired
COMMON/ SHARE 1/ Now
COMMON/ SHARE2/ MissilesDown
COMMON/ SHARE3/ Iseed, ProbAcq, TimeAcq, Threshold, Rate,
+NrMissiles
Sample from a Uniform(0,l) to determine outcome of acquisition.
CALL RANNUM( 1, Iseed, 0.0, 1.0, 0, X)
Acquired = .FALSE.
If( X .le. ProbAcq ) Acquired = .TRUE.
If( Acquired ) then
When missile is acquired schedule a "Shooting" event
CALL SCHEDULE( Now+TimeAcq, 2)
else
Upon failure to acquire schedule another acquisition in time = current time +
acquisition time + threshold.







REAL Now, Tsample, Threshold, Rate, ProbAcq, TimeAcq
INTEGER MissilesDown, Iseed, NrMissiles
LOGICAL Destroyed
COMMON/ SHARE 1/ Now
COMMON/ SHARE2/ MissilesDown




* Sample the exponential destruction time
* CALL RANNUM( 3, Iseed, Rate, 0.0, 0.0, Tsample)
Destroyed = .FALSE.
* When the sampled time is less than the threshold time, the missile is killed
If( Tsample .le. Threshold ) Destroyed = .TRUE.
If( Destroyed ) then
MissilesDown = MissilesDown + 1
* If all missile have been shot ...
If(MissilesDown .eq. NrMissiles) then
Return
else
* If some missiles remain, schedule another acquisition immediately
CALL SCHEDULE( Now+Tsample, 1)
End If
else
* If the missile is not destroyed, schedule an acquisition in time = current time
* + threshold time







C. PERFECT TASK INFORMATION
We present programs for the simulation, "Perfect Task Info Simulation", and
for the probability model, "Exact PMF for Perfect Task Info". This simulation,
unlike the preceding, has no discrete event subroutines. It represents the case
without the threshold improvement mentioned in Chapter V. The improved case,
however, is simulated with minor modifications to the code presented here. The
same applies to the plots displayed in Chapter IV, for the PMF of N(T). To generate
those plots, we also used a small APL function which computes the frequency of
the data, adapted from Thomson [Ref. 10].
The main program variables are:
"E" is a real array for storage of the task times.
"Sum" accumulates the expended time.
"Time" is the time window, T.
"Rate" is the rate parameter, X, of the exponential task times.
"p" is the probability of success in acquisition.
"w" is the fixed setup or acquisition time.
"S" is used to store samples from a Uniform distribution.
"k", "kk", "kkk", are used as indices for "Do" loops.
"n" is the number of missiles.
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The commented simulation program is listed next. Subroutine SORT
implements an insertion sorting algorithm, which closely follows the code presented
by Etter [Ref. 11]. Subroutine STAT is also used by the previous simulations.
PROGRAM Perfect Task Info Simulation
Simulation for the improved case
REAL E(500), Sum, Time, Rate, p, w, S, Lower, Average, Upper,
+Variance
INTEGER Iseed, Replications, k, kk, kkk, n
COMMON/ MAINSTAT/ Lower, Average, Upper, Variance
OPEN( 10, FTLE='/PACKGT DATA')
OPEN( 15, FILE='/PACKGT OUTPUT')
Read(10,*) Iseed, Replications
Do kkk = 1, 16
Read(10,*) Rate, n, p, w, Time
Average= 0.0
Variance = 0.0
Do kk = 1, Replications
Sample the n task times from an Exponential
Do k = 1, n
CALL RANNUM( 3, Iseed, Rate, 0.0, 0.0, E(k) )
End Do
Sorts the task times in ascending order of their lengths
CALL SORT( n, E)
k =
Sum = 0.0
Do While( k .le. n .and. Sum .It. Time )
k = k+ 1
Sample from a Uniform to determine if acquisition successful
CALL RANNUM( 1, Iseed, 0.0, 1.0, 0.0, S)
If(S .le. p) then
If acquired pack one more job
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*Sum = Sum + w + E(k)
Else
If not acquired, expend time window












SUBROUTINE SORT( n, E)
* Sorts the elements of the array E in increasing order. E(l) = smallest;
* E(n) = largest.
INTEGER n, kk, k
REAL E(n), Stor
LOGICAL Done
Do kk = 1, n-1
If( E(kk) .gt. E(kk+1) ) then
Done = .FALSE.
k = kk















SUBROUTINE STAT( y, n)
Computes sequential statistics
INTEGER y, n
REAL Average, Variance, Oldaverage, Upper, Intervalwidth,
+01dvariance, Lower, X










If(n .ge. 2) Average = (REAL(n-l)*01daverage+X)/Real(n)
If(n .eq. 2) Variance = Oldaverage**2+(X**2)-(2.0*(Average**2))
If(n .ge. 3) then
Variance = (REAL(n-2)/REAL(n-l)) * Oldvariance +
+ 01daverage**2 - (REAL(n)/REAL(n-l)) * Average**2 +
+ (X**2)/REAL(n-l)
End If
If(n .GE. 2) Intervalwidth = 2.0*1.96*SQRT(Variance)/SQRT(REAL(n))
Lower = Average - Intervalwidth/2.0




The program "Exact PMF for Perfect Task Info" implements the analytical
results derived in Chapter IV. It should be run with option "(NOXUFLOW", to
avoid underflow messages.
Additional variables in this program are:
• "PMF" - represents P(N(T)=j).
• "FSj" -denotes PiS^T).
The remaining variables retain their meanings and notation.
PROGRAM Exact PMF for Perfect Task Info
*
DOUBLE PRECISION Rate, Time, p, w, PMF, FSj, Average
INTEGER j, n, k
*
Open( 20, File = '/PEX DATA')
Open( 25, File = '/PEX OUTPUT')
Dok= 1, 16
Read(20,*) Rate, n, p, w, Time
Average = 0.0D0
Do j = 0, n
* Uses equation (4.23) to compute PMF
PMF = (p**j)*(1.0D00-FSj(j,Time-DBLE(j)*w,n,Rate)) -
+ (p**(j+l))*(1.0D00-FSj(j+l,Time-DBLE(j+l)*w,n,Rate))
* Average is computed with (5.1)









DOUBLE PRECISION FUNCTION FSj(jj,X,nn,Rrate)
Implements equation (4.17)
INTEGER jj, i, k
DOUBLE PRECISION X, Sum, Prod, Rrate, COMB, FACT




If( jj .le. 0) then
FSj = 0.0D00
Elself((jj.ge.l) .and. (jj.le.(nn-l))) then
Sum = 0.0D00
Compute the product term in equation (4.13)
Do i = 1, jj
Prod = 1.0D00
If ( jj .ne. 1 ) then
Do k = 1, jj
If ( i .ne. k ) then





If(ABS(Rrate*(DBLE(nn-i+l)/DBLE(jj-i+l))*X) .It. 170.0) then
Sum=Sum+Prod*(DBLE(jj-i+ 1 )/DBLE(nn-i+ 1 ))*DEXP(-Rrate*
(DBLE(nn-i+ 1 )/DBLE(jj-i+ 1 ))*X)
End If
FSj = Sum * COMB(nnjj)
If( ABS(FSj) .gt. 1.0D00) FSj = 1.0D00
End Do
Elself(jj .eq. nn) then
Sum = 1.0D00
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*Do k = 1, nn-1
Sum = Sum + ((Rrate*X)**k)/FACT(k)
End Do
FSj = Sum * DEXP(-Rrate*X)





DOUBLE PRECISION FUNCTION COMB( m, p)
* Calculates the binomial coefficients
* \P
INTEGER m, p, k
COMB = 1.0D+00
If( p .ne. m) then








DOUBLE PRECISION FUNCTION FACT(X)
*
* Returns the value of X!
INTEGER X, K
FACT = 1.0D+00
If( X .ge. 2 ) then
Do K = 2, X







APPENDIX B. THRESHOLD MODEL GRAPHICS
This appendix contains plots for the Threshold model. The response surfaces
shown were obtained in GRAFSTAT [Ref. 12], from simulation output.
In both plots the most salient feature is that the expected number of missiles
killed is not very sensitive to the threshold alone.
THRESHOLD
//7\ P = 0-^5; n = 50;



















Figure Bl. Threshold and Acquisition Time as factors
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THRESHOLD
p = 0.75; n = 50;





Figure B2. Rate and Threshold as factors
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APPENDIX C. DISTRIBUTION OF Sj
In this appendix, we describe the evidence which suggested that a Gamma
distribution would provide a suitable approximation to the distribution of Sj (the
approximation is developed in subsection IV.C.l).
A slight adaptation of the program to simulate the packing problem (Perfect
Task Information) was used, to produce samples of Sj for several values of j. These
samples of size 1000, were used to construct Gamma probability plots. One such
plot is depicted in Figure CI, for j=5.
Other plots, with different values of j, produced much similar results. As can
be seen, the sampled distribution seems to closely follow the shape of a Gamma. In
all plots slight departures from linearity were only observed at the right tail.
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Figure CI. Probability Plot
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